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NOTES
THE UNSOUNDNESS OF CALIFORNIA'S
NONCOMPENSABILITY RULE AS
APPLIED TO BUSINESS LOSSES
IN CONDEMNATION CASES
The elements that constitute "business damage," as used in this
note, are lost profits and goodwill. Profits, generally, are the amount
of the sales revenue of the business minus all costs of doing business.
Goodwill is the general reputation of a busines as measured by "the
expectation of continued patronage by a regular clientele."' The dis-
tinction between these two elements was perhaps best expressed by
the Iowa Supreme Court:
Profits are the gains realized from trade; good-will is that which
brings trade. A favorable location of a mercantile establishment, or
the habit of customers to resort to a particular locality, will bring
trade. This advantage may be designated by the term "good-will."
What the trader gains from the trade so acquired are profits. 2
General Rule: Noncompensability
The eminent domain clause in the California Constitution pro-
vides: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation. . . ."-3 A property owner has a rem-
edy under this clause against any public entity for "private property"
that is "taken or damaged for public use." That remedy is inverse
condemnation,4 which is an eminent domain suit initiated by the prop-
erty owner instead of the condemnor. 5 Unfortunately, property own-
ers that have initiated inverse condemnation suits have been denied
compensation for lost profits and goodwill through judicial misinter-
pretation of this clause.6 As a result, California businessmen often
1 AN ACT TO PROVIDE COMPENSATION FOR Loss OF Gooaw IL RESULTING
FROM EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS § 102(a), printed in 3 HARV. J. LEGIS.
445 (1966).
2 Carey v. Gunnison, 17 N.W. 881, 885 (Iowa 1885).
3 CAL. CowsT. art. I, § 14 (emphasis added).
4 See Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885).
5 Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 663 n.1, 394 P.2d 719,
721 n.1, 39 Cal. Rptr. 903, 905 n.1 (1964).
0 Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 P. 705 (1915);
see Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 394 P.2d 719, 39 Cal. Rptr.
903 (1964); People v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d 519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151,
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960); People v. Dunn, 46 Cal. 2d 639, 297 P.2d
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suffer noncompensable damage to their businesses caused by a public
entity's construction of a public improvement.7  In some cases the
entity purchases the real property (or a part of it) upon which the
business is conducted;8 in other cases, the public entity interferes with
customer access through construction activity without purchasing any
of the real property.9 California, with only one exception, 10 has fol-
lowed for more than half a century" the general rule that, in the
absence of a statute, injury claimed by a real property owner for lost
profits or goodwill of his business is noncompensable under the emi-
nent domain clause of the constitution. 12  In view of the forceful
language employed by the California Supreme Court in enunciating
this rule,13 the evolution of any new approach through decisional law
is doubtful.
Underlying all the decisions that deny compensation for lost prof-
its and goodwill is an explicit 1 4 or implicit 15 balancing of "the magni-
tude of the damage to the owner of the land [against] the desir-
ability and necessity for the particular type of improvement and the
danger that the granting of compensation will tend to retard or pre-
vent it."'16 Unfortunately, the balance has always been weighed in
favor of the condemnor.17 The one exception was in Natural Soda
Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 8 where the California Supreme Court
awarded damages for lost profits caused by a direct physical intrusion
of flood waters into the company's two manufacturing plants. This
decision, however, has not been followed and is inconsistent when
964 (1956); People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943); Rose v.
State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); Eachus v. Los Angeles Ry., 103 Cal.
614, 37 P. 750 (1894); San Francisco v. Kiernan, 98 Cal. 614, 33 P. 720 (1893).
But see Muller v. Southern Pac. Ry., 83 Cal. 240, 23 P. 265 (1890).
7 See, e.g., Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 401 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968).
8 See, e.g., Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 P.
705 (1915).
9 See, e.g., Morris v. San Francisco, 59 Cal. App. 364, 210 P. 824 (1922).
10 See Natural Soda Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 193, 143 P.2d
12 (1943).
11 See, e.g., People v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d 519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151,
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960); San Francisco v. Kiernan, 98 Cal. 614, 33 P.
720 (1893).
12 2 P. Nichols, THE LAW OF EMNENT DomAwN § 6.441 (rev. 3d ed. 1964);
see Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 P. 705 (1915).
1' "A particular business might be entirely destroyed and yet not diminish
the actual value of the property . . . ." People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390,
396, 144 P.2d 799, 802 (1943).
14 See, e.g., Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 359, 144 P.2d 818,
823 (1943).
15 See, e.g., Morris v. San Francisco, 59 Cal. App. 364, 210 P. 824 (1922).
16 Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 359, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943).
17 See, e.g., People v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d 519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151,
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960).
18 23 Cal. 2d 193, 143 P.2d 12 (1943).
[VOL 20
compared to prior and subsequent cases in which a plaintiff has
claimed compensation for lost profits.'9 In other cases the courts
repeatedly have found the state's interest compelling, as evidenced
by their reluctance to hold that there has been any actual damage sus-
tained by the property owner that is compensable under constitu-
tional mandates.
20
The purpose of this note, therefore, is to examine critically the
anachronistic and unjust rule that denies property owners compen-
sation from a public entity for lost profits and goodwill, and to impel
the abrogation of such rule by either the courts or the legislature.
Integrated into the analysis of judicial arguments supporting this
rule will be two hypothetical situations illustrating the property own-
,er's claim for lost profits and goodwill.
21
Recovery for Business Losses When Real Estate Is Taken
Typical Fact Situation
A owns and operates a retail store and has developed a steady
clientele. The business has been making a profit of $10,000 per year
for 10 years. A public entity has condemned his property for a public
use22 and has offered A the fair market value of his real property
($50,000); however, no consideration was given to the element of
goodwill in valuing the property. A will not be able to relocate.23 A
argues that he is entitled to compensation for the value of his good-
will, i.e., $40,000.24
19 See People v. Dunn, 46 Cal. 2d 639, 297 P.2d 964 (1956); Stockton &
Copperopolis R.R. v. Galgiani, 49 Cal. 139 (1874).
20 See cases cited in note 6 supra.
21 See text accompanying notes 24 & 74 infra.
22 " Public use' within the meaning of section 14 [CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 14]
is defined as a use which concerns the whole community or promotes the
general interest in its relation to any legitimate object of government." Bauer
v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 284, 289 P.2d 1, 6 (1955).
23 The problems involved if relocation were possible are outside the
scope of this note. For a discussion of the subject, see generally Note, Com-
pensation for Moving Expenses of Personal Property in Eminent Domain
Proceedings, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 749 (1969).
24 The value of the goodwill was determined by assuming certain vari-
ables and applying them to a standard formula. The formula is V X R = I.
V = Value of the goodwill; R = the capitalization rate measuring the rate
of expected return or profit based on the value of the asset (in this case the
asset is goodwill); I = income attributable to the employment of an asset
(in this case goodwill). In the hypothetical above A has earned an income of
$10,000 each year. The real property is worth $50,000. A buyer will attribute
some part of the $10,000 income to employment of the real property in oper-
ating the business. That portion is determined by the return realized by
owners of similar property in the area of the same character as A's. The
average return on similar property is 8%. It follows that A is entitled to an
8% return on his investment of $50,000 in the real estate, or $4,000. Subtract-
January 19691 BUSINESS LOSSES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The "Not Property" Argument
The first argument for denying compensation for lost profits and
goodwill when real property is taken was applied in Oakland v. Pa-
cific Coast Lumber Co.,25 a leading California case. The city brought
suit to condemn a leasehold interest of the lumber company. The
lumber company claimed that it sustained damage to its business by
reason of the taking. The leased property had been used as a lumber-
yard in connection with the company's mill business that was located
on separate property some distance away, no part of which had been
itself condemned. In holding the business losses damnum absque in-
juria,26 Justice Henshaw said that business is not "private property"
within the eminent domain clause:
It is quite within the power of the legislature to declare that a damage
to that form of property known as business or the goodwill of a busi-
ness shall be compensated for, but unless the constitution or the legis-
lature has so declared, it is the universal rule of construction that an
injury or inconvenience to a business is damnum absque injuria, and
does not form an element of the compensating damages to be
awarded.2
7
ing the $4,000 attributable to the real estate, $6,000 remains attributable to
goodwill. It will be assumed that a business similar to A's returns to its
owner 15% of the value of his investment, exclusive of any return on real
property. Therefore, the rate of return-the capitalization rate-is 15%.
Thus, R = .15 and I = 6000. Using the formula V X R = I, then V X .15 =
6000; and V - $40,000. The value of the goodwill is thereby computed to be
$40,000.
The reasonableness of this figure becomes apparent when one considers
that A can only be "made whole" by -compensation which includes the value
of his goodwill. For example, if A were paid only $50,000 (the value of his
real estate) and invested the money in similar property, which returns 8%,
A would have an annual income of only $4,000; whereas, before his property
was taken by the public entity, he haa had an income of $10,000. On the other
hand, if ',A is paid an additional $40,000 for the value of his goodwill, he can
invest it in another business similar to the one which was taken with a return
of 15% on his investment. Adding the 8% return on the new land--$4,000-
and the 15% return on the new business-$6,000-A now has an income of
$10,000 annually; he is "made whole." "The guiding principal of just compen-
sation is reimbursement to the owner for the property ... taken; he is entitled
to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been
taken; he must be made whole . .. ." Costa Mesa Union School Dist. v.
Security First Nat'l Bank, 254 Cal. App. 2d 4, 10, 62 Cal. Rptr. 113, 117 (1967)
(emphasis added). For a discussion of the formula V X R = I, see AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 266 (3d
ed. 1960).
25 171 Cal. 392, 153 P. 705 (1915).
26 Id. "[T]hat doctrine [damnum absque injuria] means merely that a
person may suffer damages and be without remedy because no legal right
or right established by law and possessed by him, has been invaded, or the
person causing the damage owes no duty known to the law to refrain from
doing the act causing the damage." Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 729, 123
P.2d 505, 514 (1942).
27 171 Cal. 392, 398, 153 P. 705, 707 (1915).
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This language of the court clearly distinguishes between tangible
and intangible property for purposes of compensation under the
eminent domain clause, the result being that compensation for good-
will was denied. However, neither the United States Constitution nor
the California Constitution makes an express distinction between
property which is compensable and property which is not.28 Further-
more, the United States Supreme Court has required compensation
for intangible property under the fifth amendment.29  And finally,
even Justice Henshaw in the Oakland case admitted that business
losses should be compensable, but felt constrained by then existing
law:
[B]usiness is property, and when the taking by the state or its agen-
cies interferes with, impairs, damages, or destroys a business, compen-
sation may be recovered therefor. We are not to be understood as
saying that this should not be the law when we do say that it is not our
law.3 0
The courts' rationale for ignoring business damage was predicated
on the belief that recognition of goodwill as compensable "private
property" would deter public improvements because of the added
cost.31 However, when the question of business damage arises be-
tween private litigants in tort and contract actions, the courts do not
hesitate in recognizing business damage as compensable property.
3 2
28 U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 14.
29 "[Jlust compensation requires payment for the franchise to take tolls
as well as for the value of the tangible property ... ." Monongahela Navi-
gation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 345 (1892). Monongahela quoted
with approval language from Montgomery County v. Bridge Co., 110 Pa. 54
(1885): "[T]o measure the damages by the mere cost of building the bridge
would be to deprive the company of any compensation for the destruction of
its franchises. The latter can no more be taken without compensation than its
tangible corporeal property. Their value hecessarily depends upon their
productiveness. If they yield no money in return over expenditures, they
would possess little if any present value. If, however, they yield a revenue
over and above expenses, they possess a present value, the amount of which
depends in a measure, upon the excess of revenue. Hence it is manifest that
the income from the bridge was a necessary and proper subject of inquiry
before the jury." Montgomery County v. Bridge Co., 110 Pa. 54, 59 (1885).
But see United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 126 (1967) (restricting Monon-
gahela to its facts).
30 171 Cal. 392, 398, 153 P. 705, 707 (1915) (emphasis added).
31 See, e.g., Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 359, 144 P.2d 818,
823 (1943); Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 P. 705
(1915).
32 Lucky Auto Supply v. Turner, 244 Cal. App. 2d 872, 53 Cal. Rptr. 628
(1966) (breach of contract); Engle v. Oroville, 238 Cal. App. 2d 266, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 630 (1965) (nuisance action approving recovery for loss of profits if
proof adequate); Meyers v. Stephens, 233 Cal. App. 2d 104, 43 Cal. Rptr. 420
(1965) (tort); Gainer v. Storck, 169 Cal. App. 2d 681, 338 P.2d 195 (1959)
(tort damages for lost profits due to faulty brake repair on truck); Mann v.
Jackson, 141 Cal. App. 2d 6, 296 P.2d 120 (1956) (breach of contract in con-
struction of wire assembling machine); Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Co.,
105 Cal. App. 2d 382, 233 P.2d 914 (1951) (nuisance).
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Justice Henshaw's admission that business, i.e., goodwill, is prop-
erty, coupled with the general judicial recognition in other contexts
that profits and goodwill "are property, suggests that a restrictive
interpretation of "private property" is in conflict with awarding
"just compensation" to the property owner. To say that the expan-
sion of "private property" to include profits and goodwill would stop
public improvements because of the prohibitive cost to the public
entity is begging the question. Decisions applying this restriction of-
fer no statistical proof of that prediction.3 3 On the contrary, exper-
ience in those jurisdictions that allow compensation for lost profits
and goodwill in condemnation proceedings demonstrates that, in
fact, stoppage of public improvements does not result.
3 4
The "Benefit to the Condemnor" Argument
The second major argument for denying compensation for business
losses is that the condemnor will receive no benefit from the business
alleged to have been taken. As stated in Oakland, damages are lim-
ited to the property taken and there can be no "taking" of any "busi-
ness... which may have been conducted upon the property."35
Conversely, in Southern California Edison v. Railroad Commis-
sion,36 compensation for business losses was awarded when the con-
demnor intended to continue operation of the business conducted upon
the land.37 The condemnor condemned the plaintiff's utility com-
pany, intending to continue to operate the utility business itself. The
utility company was awarded compensation based on the reasonable
return of its plant investment. Edison distinguished Oakland on the
ground that in the latter case the lumber company's business was
not taken to be run as such by the condemnor.
To a condemnor the distinction made between Oakland and Edison
is a practical one. If the property condemned will produce an income
that will eventually repay the condemnor for his initial acquisition
cost, then the property is of greater benefit to him, and its owner is
entitled to greater compensation. This distinction, however, is un-
sound because the property owner is entitled to just compensation
measured by the fair market value of his property in any situation
where his real property is taken.3 8 All factors that a private buyer
33 See cases cited note 6 supra where all lacked this statistical proof.
34 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.071(3b) (Supp. 1968), construed in
State Road Dep't v. White, 148 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 1-609 (Supp. 1967), construed in Lancaster Redevelopment Auth. Appeal,
425 Pa. 36, 227 A.2d 827 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, ch. 5, § 221(2) (1959),
construed in Fiske v. State H'way Bd., 124 Vt. 87, 197 A.2d 790 (1964); In re
Grand Haven H'way, 357 Mich. 20, 97 N.W.2d 748 (1959).
35 Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co., 171 Cal. 392, 399, 153 P. 705,
707 (1915).
36 6 Cal. 2d 737, 59 P.2d 808 (1936).
37 Id.
38 See Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 737, 123 P.2d 505, 519 (1942).
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would consider in arriving at fair market value must be weighed in
determining just compensation. 9 A buyer of a business places heavy
emphasis upon the profits and goodwill in appraising its value.
40 It
follows, therefore, that the public entity should also include the value
of the business when appraising the fair market value of the prop-
erty. Realistically, the property owner would not sell to a private
buyer unless he did in fact receive a fair price; he should not have to
lose his property to the state at a lower price based upon the distinc-
tion made in the Edison case that it is worth more only if there is a
greater benefit to the condemnor.
Moreover, in 1953, the California Supreme Court stated, contrary
to the assumption made in the Edison case, that " [ c] ompensation is
based on loss imposed on the owner, rather than on benefit received
by the taker."4 1 This principle was first applied in 1890 in Muller v.
Southern Pacific Railway Company,42 where just compensation was
measured by what the condemnee was to lose, including the value of
the business that may have been conducted on the land. From the
language the court employs, it is not clear whether it intended to
imply that future profits, as the only possible measurement of a pro-
spective "business," were recoverable, or whether the court was
merely guilty of imprecise terminology. However, although Muller
has never been overruled, the decision has consistently been disre-
garded and is, therefore, questionable authority. At best, it is an
anomaly in the California law.
The statement in Oakland that a business is not "property" and,
therefore, is not capable of being "taken" leads to a denial of just
compensation for an actual loss suffered by the condemnee. 43 The
California Supreme Court should return to the principle first enunci-
ated in Muller; or the California Legislature should heed Justice
Henshaw's admission in the Oakland44 case that goodwill of a busi-
ness is "property" and enact remedial legislation.
The "Speculation!' Argument
The third major argument used to deny compensation for lost
profits and goodwill when real property is taken can be briefly stated
as follows: Lost profits and goodwill are too "speculative" to ascer-
tain with any degree of certainty, and they are not compensable,
therefore, under the eminent domain clause.
45
In Stockton & Copperopolis Railroad Company v. Galgiani,46
39 See CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 814.
40 See Aloi & Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Good Will, and Busi-
ness Losses in. Eminent Domain, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 604, 607 (1968).
41 People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal. 2d 738, 754, 264 P.2d 15, 22 (1953).
42 83 Cal. 240, 23 P. 265 (1890).
43 See Muller v. Southern Pac. Ry., 83 Cal. 240, 23 P. 265 (1890).
44 171 Cal. 392, 398, 153 P. 705, 707 (1915).
45 E.g., People v. Dunn, 46 Cal. 2d 639, 297 P.2d 964 (1956).
46 49 Cal. 139 (1874).
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a strip of farmland was "taken" by the condemnor, and the condemnee
introduced evidence of the net profits derived from the crops grown
on the strip as an element to be considered in determining "just com-
pensation." The court held this evidence inadmissible on the ground
that any attempted proof of annual profits would depend upon too
many uncertain variables, such as the price of labor, the nature of the
season, and the market factor of supply and demand. "A valuation
from such evidence would be conjectural and speculative, and would
not form a basis for an estimate of damages.
'47
This decision was handed down in 1874. At that time the Califor-
nia Constitution did not include the "or damaged" section, which was
added in 1879.48 By implication the court was saying that if such
evidence had not been "speculative" it would have been an element to
consider in determining just compensation under the constitutional
provisions for "taking" property. Subsequent decisions, however,
have avoided discussing this implication Where there has been a "tak-
ing" by resort to the court-created "not property" argument.
49
The Michigan court squarely faced the issue of speculation in the
case of In re Grand Haven Highway,50 justly resolving it in favor of
the condemree. In Grand Haven a condemnation action was brought
by the highway department to take a part of the land and buildings of
a manufacturer. The latter was forced to move to a new location and
sought' compensation for 'profits lost during the period his business
was interrupted. The accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst prepared
the following evidence, which was admitted:
Additional direct labor 'cogts $20,633.32
Additional indirect labor costs 7,091.67
Efficiency loss of direct productive labor 7,970.10
Estimated additional cost of operating dual facilities
during the relocation period 17,371.00
Total $53,066.0951
Since this additional cost was absorbed into general production costs,
it necessarily reduced net profits by the same amount.
The court said:
To eliminate any doubt of this Court's position, we hold that the evi-
dence introduced in this condemnation proceeding showing expense
occasioned by business interruption was properly introduced for con-
sideration ....
To recover damages from business interruptions the proof must
not be speculative and must possess a reasonable degree of cer-
-tainty.52
47 Id. at 140.
48 See Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 500-01, 6 P. 317, 322 (1885).
49 See, e.g., Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 394 P.2d 719,
39 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1964).
50 357 Mich. 20, 97 N.W.2d 748 (1959).
51 Id. at 33, 97 N.W.2d at 754.
52 Id. at 31-32, 97 N.W.2d at 754.
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The court in Grand Haven gave substance to "just compensation"
by implying that its holding would be applicable to any entire "tak-
ing," and would not be limited to the facts in Grand Haven.53 The
court said that although the property owner must yield to public
necessity, in no instance is he to make any sacrifice in doing so. This
is the essence of "just compensation."54
The words "just compensation" as interpreted by the California
courts also imply that no sacrifice is to be made by the condemnee;
the property owner should be made whole, or put in as good a pecun-
iary position after the taking as he would have been in had there been
no taking.55 However, this language is only lip service to the prin-
ciple of just compensation. Compare the following results to A in the
hypothetical situation discussed above, under the principle of just
compensation as applied in Michigan and then as applied in California:
MICHIGAN
Amount paid for real property $50,000
Value of goodwill 40,00056
Total Recovery $90,000
CALIFORNIA
Amount paid for real property $50,000
Total Recovery $50,000
Certainly this $40,000 "sacrifice"°made by A to the State of California
could be absorbed better by the taxpayers as a whole, rather than by
any one individual.
57
There are situations in California where even the taxpayers
would be relieved of this burden, e.g., where the condemnor is a
revenue-producing public entity such as a rapid. transit district, a
bridge authority, or a municipal transportation system.58 When
such a public entity constructs a public, improvement the initial con-
struction cost is financed by the sale of revenue bonds to the public.59
53 Bienefeld, Real and Personal Property, 7 WAYNE L. REV. 181, 191
(1960).
54 357 Mich. 20, 28, 97 N.W.2d 748, 752 (1959).
55 Costa Mesa Union School Dist. v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 254 Cal.
App. 2d 4, 62 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1967).
56 See note 24 supra for a discussion of the measure of goodwill.
57 "The decisive consideration is whether the owner of the damaged prop-
erty if uncompensated would contribute more than his proper share to the
public undertaking." Clement v. State Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 642,
220 P.2d 897, 905 (1950); see Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 428, 432
P.2d 3, 15, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 413 (1967) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 949 (1968).
58 See Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative
Prospectus, 8 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1, 34 (1967).
59 See, e.g., SAN FRANcIsco BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DIsTRICT, OFFICIAL
STATEMENT RELATING TO $70,000,000 GENERAL OBLIGATION BoNDs, SERIES J.
(Copy on file in Hastings Law Library).
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After the completion of the public improvement, the operating rev-
enue generated pays off the bonded indebtedness with interest; thus,
the taxpayer does not contribute his tax dollar to the cost of construc-
tion. 0 In either case-whether the condemnor is a revenue-produc-
ing public entity or not-A, or property owners in his situation,
should not have to make this sacrifice.
In the above comparison of Michigan and California law, good-
will was measured according to the formula set out above;6 however,
several state courts have successfully measured goodwill in condem-
nation actions in compliance with state statutes.62 The Vermont court
in applying its statute63 recognized the uncertainty in measuring dam-
age to a business, but pointed out that:
Notwithstanding uncertainty, the legislature has ordained that the
owner shall be entitled to a recovery of his consequential loss in this
respect [damage to business] [citations omitted]. The practical dif-
ficulty in ascertaining the exact amount does not stand in the way of
carrying out the statute.64
Furthermore, California agencies have, in fact, measured goodwill
when purchasing property by using the appraisal technique65 of cap-
italizing income.6 6 This suggests, therefore, that not only is goodwill
60 See Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative
Prospectus, 8 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1, 34 (1967).
61 See note 24 supra.
62 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.071(3b) (Supp. 1968), construed in, State
Road Dep't v. White, 148 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-609
(Supp. 1967), construed in, Lancaster Redevelopment Auth. Appeal, 425 Pa.
36, 227 A.2d 827 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN'. tit. 19, ch. 5, § 221(2) (1959), con-
strued in, Fiske v. State H'way Bd., 124 Vt. 87, 197 A.2d 790 (1964).
63 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, ch. 5, § 221(2) (1959).
64 Fiske v. State H'way Bd., 124 Vt. 87, 92, 197 A.2d 790, 793 (1964).
65 For example, when purchasing a filling station for the San Francisco
Bay Area Rapid Transit District, an independent appraiser will employ the
capitalization of income approach (see note 66 infra), as well as other stand-
ard methods of appraisal, in determining the fair market value of the real
property. Elements included in arriving at a proper capitalization rate are:
location, gross sales, and rate of return on investment. The maximum rate
set by the District is 7 per cent. Interview with Edward E. Jaynes, Senior
Right-of-Way Agent for the Bay Area Rapid Transit District, in San Francisco,
Sept. 6, 1968. It is interesting to note that the capitalization of income method
of appraisal necessarily includes a measure of goodwill and profit. See Aloi
& Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Good Will, and Business Losses in
Eminent Domain, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 604, 615 (1968).
66 "The capitalized income method is best described as an attempt to
measure the present value of the future income potential of a property. This
present value is determined by dividing a capitalization rate (an estimate of
the security and length of the income flow) into the yearly projected in-
come." Aloi & Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Good Will, and Busi-
ness Losses in Eminent Domain, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 604, 615 (1968). For a
complete discussion of appraisal techniques in valuing real property, includ-
ing capitalization of income, see AmERICAN INSTITuTE OF REAL ESTATE AP-
PRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, 226-82 (3d ed. 1960).
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measurable with a degree of certainty, but that consideration of the
value of goodwill is required in order to reach "just" compensation
within the eminent domain clause of the California Constitution.
6 7
The Grand Haven decision, discussed above, is also noteworthy
for its modern approach to the principle of "just compensation." The
Michigan court did not reject the speculation argument for denying
compensation, but merely said that damage to business was compen-
sable when ascertainable, and to deny compensation when adequate
proof was presented was "sacrificing" the property of the individual
to the state.68 Modern statutes in several states embody this ap-
proach and provide standards to measure damage, minimizing specula-
tion and uncertainty.6 9 This result could also be realized in California
if the legislature were to enact a similar statute requiring compensa-
tion for lost profits and goodwill and providing a means of measure-
ment thereof.70 In the absence of such legislative action, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court should overrule or modify its decision in Stock-
ton & Copperopolis Railroad Company v. Galgiani,7 ' to provide, at
least, that when adequate proof is supplied to minimize speculation,
lost profits and goodwill are elements to be considered in determining
just compensation when business property is taken.
Recovery for Business Losses When No Real Estate Is Taken
A different, albeit related, set of arguments is used to deny com-
pensation for lost profits and goodwill where no tangible real estate is
taken. The damage to profits and goodwill is usually caused by a
public entity's construction activities that interfere with customer
access, thus temporarily reducing or eliminating profits and damag-
ing the value of the business's goodwill.
7 2
Typical Fact Situation
B owns and operates a retail store. The business has been mak-
ing an annual profit of $10,000 for 10 years. A public entity has
67 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.
68 In re Grand Haven H'way, 357 Mich. 20, 28, 97 N.W.2d 748, 752 (1959).
69 See, e.g., PA. STAT. Aim. tit. 26, § 1-609 (Supp. 1967), where it is stated
that "[t]he condemnee shall be entitled to damages . . . for dislocation of a
business located on the condemned property. ... Compensation for such
dislocation shall be the actual monthly rental paid for the business premises,
or if there is no lease, the fair rental value of the business premises .... .
70 One measure of compensation could be to set the maximum award at
ten times the average earnings of the damaged business, which is not to ex-
ceed the physical assets of the business. This measure is contained in AN
ACT TO PROVIDE COMPENSATION FOR Loss or GOODWILL RESULTING FROM EIVm-
NENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS § 306, printed in 3 HARv. J. LEGIS. 445, 446 (1966).
71 49 Cal. 139 (1874).
72 E.g., People v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 332 P.2d 519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151
(1960) (temporary injury from construction of public improvement generally
noncompensable).
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started construction of a public improvement on the street abutting
B's property. As a result of the construction, B's customers are
denied access to the property, causing B to lose the profits of $15,000
he would have made during the 18-month period of construction inter-
ference. B anticipates that his business will return to normal at the
end of the construction period.
78
B argues that he is entitled to compensation for his lost profits of
$15,000 under the "or damaged" clause of the eminent domain section
of the California Constitution.
The "or damaged" Clause: Physical Intrusion Is Not Requisite
The leading California case interpreting the "or damaged" clause
is Reardon v. San Francisco.7 4 In this case the plaintiff sued in in-
verse condemnation to recover costs incurred in repairing his build-
ing's foundation, which had been damaged when the city's construc-
tion activity caused subsidence of the plaintiff's land. In affirming
the judgment for compensation, the court said:
To what kind of damage does this word "damage" refer? We think
it refers to something more than a direct or immediate damage to pri-
vate property, such as its invasion or spoilation. There is no reason
why this word should be construed in any other than its ordinary and
popular sense.75
The ordinary popular sense of the word "damage" supplied by a
dictionary is "loss due to injury; injury to person, property, or reputa-
tion; hurt; harm."7  Damage to business in the form of lost profits
easily conforms to this definition, leading one to believe that, under
the language of Reardon, B might recover his lost profits of $15,000.
The "Not Property" Argument
Despite express approval of Reardon's interpretation of "damage,"
however, the California Supreme Court in Albers v. Los Angeles
County77 said that "cases ... involving loss of business ... do not in-
volve direct physical damage to real property, but only diminution in
73 The assumption that business will return to normal limits the scope of
the damage to the profits lost during the period of interference. A situation
where business would be permanently impaired, for example, a freeway di-
verts all traffic away from a business establishment, would be tantamount to
a "taking" under the eminent domain clause, and the arguments set forth in
the first section of this note would be applicable. Fairness would demand
that the public entity compensate the owner for the diminution in the value
of his real property including the value of the goodwill of the business. The
measure of compensation should be the difference between what a willing
buyer would pay before the diminution in value and after the diminution
in value. See Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 738, 123 P.2d 505, 519-20 (1942).
74 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885).
75 Id. at 501, 6 P. at 322 (emphasis added).
76 WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DiCTIONARY 664 (2d ed. 1956).
77 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965).
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its enjoyment, s78 so that such losses are not compensable. Such
language, however, is misleading. There are at least two situations in
which the supreme court will allow compensation even in the absence
of direct physical damage: (1) where the owner's personal right of
ingress and egress is impaired;7 9 and (2) where the owner's personal
right of light and air is obstructed.80 These rights are characterized
as property rights by the courts,81 and unless an abutting property
owner claims a loss based upon one of these "property" rights, no
compensation will be allowed in the absence of physical damage.
82
Since a businessman must depend on customer access in order to
operate his business profitably, it is the infringement of this right of
customer access that should be recognized as compensable. But as the
California Supreme Court has said, " [ a] landowner has no property
right in the continuation or maintenance of the flow of traffic past
his property.1
83
Why the concept of property rights has not been expanded to in-
clude a right of customer access was discussed in Bacich v. Board of
Control.84 In that case, the court explained at length its policy con-
cerning property rights. If the court "decides" that the diminution in
the value of the property involved is of sufficient magnitude to war-
rant compensation under the eminent domain clause, then it is not
necessary to consider the presence of the public improvement as a
"damaging" of the land; the interest involved necessarily is entitled
to protection of the law and becomes a "property right" within the
meaning of the eminent domain clause. However, when the court
"decides" that an interest, e.g., the right of customer access, "is ...
of insufficient magnitude to warrant the payment of compensation
... it obviously is not 'private property' within the scope of that
clause .... 85 Under this self-determining approach, therefore, it is
78 Id. at 262, 398 P.2d at 136, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
79 Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); People ex rel. De-
partment of Pub. Works v. Presley, 239 Cal. App. 2d 310, 48 Cal. Rptr. 672
(1966).
80 Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); People ex 'rel. De-
partment of Pub. Works v. Presley, 239 Cal. App. 2d 310, 48 Cal. Rptr. 672
(1966).
81 Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); People ex rel. De-
partment of Pub. Works v. Presley, 239 Cal. App. 2d 310 48 Cal. Rptr. 672
(1966).
82 Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); People ex rel. De-
partment of Pub. Works v. Presley, 239 Cal. App. 2d 310, 48 Cal. Rptr. 672
(1966).
83 Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 737, 123 P.2d 505, 519 (1942); see Albers v.
Los Angeles County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 262, 398 P.2d 129, 136, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89,
96 (1965) (dictum); People v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 223-24, 352 P.2d 519,
522, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151, 154 (1960). But cf. Clement v. State Reclamation Bd.,
35 Cal. 2d 628, 220 P. 2d 897 (1950).
84 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
85 Id. at 359-60, 144 P.2d at 828 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).
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apparent that a court could arbitrarily "decide" for itself what is and
what is not protected by the constitution.
An extreme example of the injustice suffered when the court re-
fused to "decide" that a particular right was a compensable property
right is Colberg, Inc. v. State.8 6 The plaintiff shipbuilders claimed
damages for permanent interference with their right of riparian access
to the ocean, basing their cause of action on inverse condemnation.
The state contemplated construction of two low-level bridges that
would prohibit the launching of the plaintiffs' ships. The court re-
fused to award damages; thus 81% of one shipbuilder's business and
35% of the other's business were destroyed without any compensation.
Although one ground of the decision was that the state's police power
over navigable waterways87 was superior to any right that the plain-
tiffs' might have had, it is suggested that the true reason behind the
decision was to prevent the assertion of claims against the state treas-
ury for business damage, which the court feared might impede the
construction of public improvements.
88
The dissenting opinion of Justice Peters repudiated the harsh
position taken by the majority of the court:
I cannot agree that because the state wants to build two low level
highway bridges across the mouth of an inlet where plaintiffs' ship-
yards are located, plaintiffs must suffer the complete loss caused by
the impairment of their right of one-way . . . access to deep water.
Principles of fairness, logic and public policy suggest this loss is a part
of the freeway that should not be borne by plaintiffs but should be
borne by the public....
Such access is indispensable to the operation of plaintiffs' busi-
nesses ....
How can there be a public policy to put . . . well established
businesses out of operation without compensation? The answer is
obvious. There can be and is no such public policy.8 9
Plaintiffs' personal right of one-way access to deep water was
not the property right denied compensation; it was the right of cus-
tormer access that was, in fact, unjustly denied compensation. A cus-
tomer would not contract for the building of a ship if there were no
86 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.(2d 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 949 (1968).
87 Id. It seems the court went to extreme lengths in determining that it
was the power over navigable waterways that deprived the plaintiffs of any
compensation. The construction of the bridges was actually part of the high-
way program and it seems remote from construction of a water project, e.g.,
a dam, spillway, or dock facility. Also, the whole problem could have been
obviated by construction of draw bridges. The cost of such bridges could
have been compared to the cost of compensating plaintiffs for damage to their
businesses, and the lesser of the two amounts could have been included as a
cost of construction.
88 The unsoundness of this fear is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 33-34 supra.
89 Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 426-27, 432 P.2d 3, 15, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 401, 413 (1967) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
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deepwater access after launching. Justice Peters said that there is no
public policy that permits the destruction of well established busi-
nesses without compensation; 90 he was suggesting, therefore, that a
property owner with an established business has a right of customer
access, the denial of which by the state ought to be compensable in in-
verse condemnation as a recognized "property right."'91
To avoid the unjust result of Colberg the courts must recognize
the businessman's right of customer access. To deny this right pro-
tection is to put the burden of constructing public improvements on
the shoulders of a few private citizens, rather than on the taxpayers
as a whole where it properly belongs.9 2 Non-recognition by the courts
should inspire some action by the California Legislature. Recently,
the legislature has moved to nullify an unjust judicial rule that relo-
cation expenses in condemnation proceedings are not recoverable.
9 3
The legislature should be encouraged to follow this progressive trend
and afford protection to a businessman's right of customer access.
The "Police Power" Argument
An abutting property owner has a lawfully protected personal
right of access to and from his property-ingress and egress.9 4 When
a businessman sues for injury to this right, as distinguished from a
right of customer access, he may still be denied compensation on the
ground that there has been a lawful exercise of the police power.95
An example is People v. Ayon.9 6 In this case, the plaintiff's super-
market business was damaged as a result of the construction of a
90 Id. at 429, 432 P.2d at 15, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
91 Id. at 428-29, 432 P.2d at 15, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
92 Id.
93 CAL. PuB. UTML. CODE §§ 29110-117. The legislative history concerning
these sections exemplifies the necessity for their enactment: "This act is an
urgency measure necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace
... and shall go into immediate effect. The facts constituting such necessity
are: The acquisition of private property by the San Francisco Bay Area
Rapid Transit District for public purposes is being felt by an increasing num-
ber of citizens who are required to relocate their ... businesses. These per-
sons incur moving expenses which are not presently compensated for under
California law. The expeditions, payment of moving expenses and the ef-
ficient operation of the right-of-way acquisition program by said district re-
quires the immediate authorization to pay moving expenses to those eligible
persons displaced by district construction projects." 1966 JoURAL OF THE
ASSElVMBLY 1522.
94 Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); People ex rel. De-
partment of Pub. Works v. Presley, 239 Cal. App. 2d 310, 48 Cal Rptr. 672
(1966).
95 See, e.g., Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 418-19, 432 P.2d 3, 8, 62
Cal. Rptr. 401, 408 (1967); People v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 224, 352 P.2d 519,
523, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151, 155, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960).
06 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d 519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827
(1960).
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dividing strip in the middle of the highway abutting his property.
In denying compensation for the impairment of the plaintiff's lawful
right of access-actual damage being caused by the denial of the plain-
tiff's right of customer access-the court said the damage was non-
compensable because there had been a lawful exercise of the police
power in regulating traffic: "If a loss of business ... results, that is
noncompensable. It is simply a risk the property owner assumes
when he lives in modern society . . . ."97 Recognizing that it had
rather off-handedly dismissed the plaintiff's claim for business losses,
the court hastened to add: "Moreover, the location of the alley ...
greatly mitigates any inconvenience to appellants' customers."98
A more reasonable statement as to when the police power should
be invoked to deny compensation was laid down in Rose v. State.99
In that case a result opposite from Ayon was reached when the state
impaired the traffic flow on the street abutting the plaintiff's prop-
erty. The court said that the building of such a highway improve-
ment was not an "emergency" and did not qualify, therefore, as a
noncompensable exercise of the police power. To invoke the police
power indiscriminately in the construction of a public improvement
would "[d] estroy the protection guaranteed by our Constitution
against the taking or damaging of private property for a public use
without compensation." 00
Although this statement reflects a reasonable invocation of the
police power, it has not been applied uniformly. The courts have
drawn a distinction between physical and nonphysical injury to prop-
erty, invoking the police power to deny compensation only in the lat-
ter case. 10 ' This distinction is unsound law because both tangibles
and intangibles are property' 0 2-specifically a property owner's per-
sonal right of access' 03-- and should be compensable when damaged
by a public entity under the eminent domain clause. 0 4 Logic dictates
that all forms of property should be treated uniformly whether there
has been a physical injury or not. 05
The "Speculation" Argument Revisited
The speculation argument for denying compensation for business
losses has been found unsound as applied to a physical taking'0 6 upon
97 Id. at 223-24, 352 P.2d at 522, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
98 Id. at 226, 352 P.2d at 524, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
99 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942).
100 Id. at 730-31, 123 P. 2d at 516.
101 Compare People v. Ayon, 54 Cal. 2d 217, 352 P.2d 519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151
(1960), with Albers v. Los Angeles" County, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965).
102 See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
103 See text accompanying note 105 infra.
104 See text accompanying notes 78-93 supra.
105 For a general discussion of the police power and eminent domain, see
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
106 See text accompanying notes 50-71 supra.
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the following grounds: (1) the admission of proper evidence will
provide a reasonable degree of certainty;107 and (2) other jurisdictions
have successfully overcome the uncertainties in measuring business
losses.10 8 Although no cases have been found employing this argu-
ment where there has not been a taking of real property, the follow-
ing discussion of one California case will serve to emphasize the un-
soundness of the "speculation" argument where no real property is
taken and the condemnee claims lost profits.
In Natural Soda Products Co. v. Los Angeles,10 9 the plaintiff
manufacturer brought an action for trespass to land in the nature of
inverse condemnation for damages caused by the city's flooding of a
dry lake, which inundated the manufacturer's brine wells, pipelines
and processing plants. The plants had never made a profit, but evi-
dence was admitted showing a loss of future profits based upon antici-
pated operational revenue. Damages of $153,578.85, which included
loss of future profits, were awarded.110 Justice (now Chief Justice)
Traynor mentioned several requirements that had to be met in order
to justify the award of lost profits: (1) past sales records, (2) price
stability, and (3) past operational expenses, including labor costs, de-
preciation, insurance and taxes."'
Although Soda appears to support a property owner's claim for
lost profits in inverse condemnation when no real property has been
"taken," the condemnor in that case did not question the propriety of
awarding damages for lost profits. The case has since lain dormant,
never having been followed or cited when other condemnees have
claimed lost profits. 1 2 Further, the case could be restricted to its
107 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
108 See note 69 supra.
109 23 Cal. 2d 193, 143 P.2d 12 (1943).
110 It is interesting to note that the court spoke in terms of inverse con-
demnation when awarding compensation. Id. However, no argument was
raised by the defense alleging that damage to business was noncompensable.
This argument could have been based on prior case law. Oakland v. Pacific
Coast Lumber Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 P. 705 (1915).
111 "In addition to other items, plaintiff was awarded damages for loss of
profits, which defendant contends was not proved with certainty. The award
of damages for loss of profits depends upon whether there is a satisfactory
basis for estimating what the probable earning would have been .... In the
present case plaintiff's probable gross receipts could be estimated from its
sales in the preceeding two years, in view of the evidence that prices were
stable. Its unit cost could be estimated on the basis of detailed figures con-
cerning actual expenses, such as labor, depreciation, insurance, taxes, and
royalties for the limited operations carried on .... Its plant capacity was
conservatively estimated at 90 tons per day .... Awards of prospective
profits have been sustained on the basis of much less satisfactory evidence."
Natural Soda Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 193, 199-200, 143 P.2d
12, 17 (1943).
112 See People v. Dunn, 46 Cal. 2d 639, 297 P.2d 964 (1956). Soda has
been cited as authority for the recovery of lost profits in contract and tort,
actions between private litigants. See cases cited in note 32 supra.
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specific facts, i.e., a direct physical intrusion of flood waters, and thus
distinguished from the hypothetical situations above. 3 It is doubt-
ful, therefore, that this isolated case could be used successfully today
to recover lost profits even under the same facts as Soda. However, if
the case were given life by the California Supreme Court, the require-
ments outlined by Justice Traynor for the compensability of lost prof-
its could easily be met by B in the hypothetical above as he has had
10 years of operating experience which would demonstrate his ex-
penses, sales and profit.
Summary and Conclusion
This note has attempted to establish the unsoundness of judicially
imposed restrictions in denying compensation for lost profits and
goodwill by analyzing the weaknesses of the arguments supporting
such restrictions. The interpolation of a distinction between tan-
gible and intangible property is invalid;" 4 the fiction embodied in
holding that a business is not property and, therefore, is not taken is
specious." 5 Non-recognition of the right of customer access is a de-
nial of just compensation that imposes an unfair burden upon the
property owner, a burden that should be borne by the taxpayers as
a whole." 6 Use of the police power to deny compensation for intan-
gible property rights is inconsistent, resulting in unjust losses that
are offensive to the constitution." 7  Finally, the speculation argu-
ment as applied to a taking or a damaging is inapplicable when proper
evidence is presented."
8
Clearly the court has not shown the way for proper relief to the
property owner in condemnation proceedings. In the hypotheticals,
A would presently be denied the value of his goodwill-$40,000-and
B would be denied compensation for his lost profits-$15,000. There
has been no attempt to pursue the trend established by the Michigan
court in the Grand Haven'" case, that lost profits are an element of
compensation when real property is "taken" precluding any "sacri-
fice" by the property owner, thereby satisfying the constitutional re-
quirement of just compensation. The result in the Colberg120 case,
that the property owner is denied any compensation for destruction
of his business in the absence of a protected property interest, was an
113 See Albers v. Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 262, 398 P.2d 129, 136, 42
Cal. Rptr. 89, 96 (1965). But see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (Legislative Comm.
Comment), where it is stated that all government liability arising out of tort
is abolished except for liability as may be required by inverse condemnation.
i14 See text accompanying. notes 24-34 supra.
115 See text accompanying notes 38-44 supra.
116 See text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
117 See text accompanying note 89 supra.
118 See text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
119 In re Grand Haven H'way, 357 Mich. 20, 97 N.W.2d 748 (1959).
120 Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1967).
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absolute denial of justice, as pointed out by Justice Peters in his dis-
senting opinion,12' and must be prevented from recurrence. This
burden can better be shared by the taxpayers as a whole rather than
by any one individual.
22
The words of the eminent domain clause demand proper interpre-
tation and application. Since there are no express restrictions within
the clause itself, the plain meaning of the language should be sup-
ported. 23 The constitution is a viable document that cannot be used
to justify the anachronisms present in judicial decisions. The courts
have constructed a judicial maze of inconsistent and arbitrary opin-
ions dealing with business damage and property rights. Thus, the
California Legislature now has the responsibility to enact remedial
legislation that will give the California businessman just compensa-
tion. 24 In drafting such legislation, the California lawmakers would
do well to heed the language of the Vermont court, which interpreted
the motives of its own legislature as follows:
We are convinced that the overriding purpose of the Legis-
lature in enacting a new condemnation law was to see to it that
the landowner should receive fair treatment .... To this end and in
keeping with this purpose, it provided for damages for business loss,
something which almost no other jurisdiction had set out to do. The
whole spirit of the Act was to see to it that the landowner would get
just treatment and fair compensation .... 125
The California businessman deserves no less.
Leon Stuart Sange*
121 Id. at 426, 432 P.2d at 15, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 413 (dissenting opinion).
'122 Id.
123 See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
124 See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra.
125 Farrell v. State Highway Bd., 123 Vt. 453, 458, 194 A.2d 410, 413
(1963) (emphasis added).
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